Quantitative restrictions in experimental posted-offer markets

The effect of imposing binding and non-binding quantity restrictions upon price convergence in posted-offer markets is discussed. Unlike in the price control experiments prices do not jump after the removal of quantity restrictions. Further, a surprising property of prices was observed in these experiments, prices converge from below the competitive equilibrium. This result contradicted the well established empirical regularity that price convergence is from above the competitive equilibrium in Posted-Offer markets. Thus, the asymmetric distribution of surplus, or the imposition of quotas themselves affected price convergence in the quota experiments

A proof of first-order stochastic dominance for quantity constrained oligopolies

In this paper a proof for First Order Stochastic Dominance for capacity constrained oligopolies exhibiting equilibrium in mixed strategies is derived. The result is an extension of Levitan and Shubik (1972) where they derive the mixed strategy equilibrium for quantity constrained oligopolies. I show that their result has applications in policy issues in Regulation and Trade Theory. The proof of First Order Stochastic Dominance facilitates the comparison of expected prices across different experimental/trade policy designs, enlarging the qualitative implications of the results derived by Levitan et al

Minimum quality levels and import tariffs

In a vertically differentiated duopoly the use of import tariffs by an importing country decreases domestic welfare if import tariffs are chosen once the firms have made their quality decisions. In this paper we propose import tariffs that are contingent on some minimum quality level (MQL) being met. A firm is taxed if it fails to meet these MQL. Import tariffs conditional on fulfilling the MQL are welfare improving over free trade. Investment in quality increases, market coverage goes up and consumer surplus increases. Firm profits decrease relative to free trade under such tariffs

Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment

Incentives to vertically integrate are studied in an industry where downstream firms are vertically differentiated. Vertical integration by one of the firms increases production costs for the rival. Increased production costs impact quality investment both by the integrated firm and the unintegrated rival. A firm, integrating first, always produces the high quality good and earns higher profits. Quality investment by both firms decreases under any (vertical integration) scenario and competition among downstream firms is softened. A fully integrated industry, with increased product differentiation, is observed in equilibrium. Due to increase in firm profits, social welfare under this structure is greater than under no integration

Import tariffs, quality investment and welfare

In this paper we study incentives for a government to impose a discriminatory or uniform import tariff on its low and high quality imports. In comparison to free trade both tariffs decrease total welfare. In response to any tariff, firms decrease quality investment and total output sold declines. The degree of product differentiation under both the tariffs increases. Consumer surplus declines by a greater amount than the increase in revenues under an import tariff. While the uniform tariff works to the advantage of the high quality firm, the discriminative tariff works to the advantage of the low quality firm. Total welfare, though lower than under free trade, is greater under a uniform than under a discriminatory tariff

Monopoly power and terms of trade

The Prebisch-Singer (PS) theory predicts that tenns of trade, given low income elasticity of demand for primary products and market power of industrialized countries, for producers of primary cornmodities in developing countries worsen as income increases. Due to problems of defining the correct price index no pure empirical test of the PS hypothesis exists. This paper uses experimental methods to test the basic premise of the PS hypothesis. The experiments do not support the PS hypothesis. The monopolist is unable to exploit its market power and tenns of trade do not worsen for the primary producers as income increases

The endowment effect

The divergence between the willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) has resulted in two explanations. First, that this may be due to the manifestation of the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). Second, the difference between WTA and WTP is directly related with the substitutability of the goods (Haneman, 1991). In this paper we show that one can observe undertrading in markets even if the WTA-WTP discrepancy is negligible. Due to underrevelation of intramarginal units very flat reported inverse supply and demand curves are obtained. As a result very small deviations in reported WTA and WTP can lead to undertrading

Policy Synchronization and Staggering in a Dynamic Model of Strategic Trade

This paper studies steady-state, Markov-Perfect strategic trade policy when (infinitely lived) governments are committed to trade policy during two periods. We compare the case in which both governments choose their export subsidies in the same periods (synchronization) versus the case in which they set them in alternate periods (staggering). We find that, under Cournot competition, welfare is higher when both governments synchronize their choice of export-promoting policy, since export subsidies are lower (closer to the cooperative solution) than when governments set them sequentially. Retaliation is therefore stronger and more harmful when governments alternate as (temporary) Stackelberg leaders. Synchronization is the equilibrium of the pre-commitment game in which both governments choose when to set their export subsidies. These results are robust to having stochastic length of commitment period and to allowing predetermined but flexible choice of subsidies by both governments. We also analyze the results of policy-staggering under alternative modes of competition and the possibility of firms investing in R&D.Strategic Trade Policy, Retaliation, Markov Perfect Equilibria, Policy-Synchronization.

MINIMUM QUALITY LEVELS AND IMPORT TARIFFS

In a vertically differentiated duopoly the use of import tariffs by an importing country decreases domestic welfare if import tariffs are chosen once the firms have made their quality decisions. In this paper we propose import tariffs that are contingent on some minimum quality level (MQL) being met. A firm is taxed if it fails to meet these MQL. Import tariffs conditional on fulfilling the MQL are welfare improving over free trade. Investment in quality increases, market coverage goes up and consumer surplus increases. Firm profits decrease relative to free trade under such tariffs.

Market access and minimum quality standards

In this paper we analyze market access blocking properties of a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS). For an importing country that imports a high and low quality good, the welfare maximizing optimal MQS limits market access only to the high quality firm. This result is further confirmed for a uniform MQS imposed by a high quality producing country that imports a low quality good. The optimal MQS in this case always blocks entry to the low quality foreign firm. We then propose a Flexible Quality Standard (FQS). Under a FQS a good is taxed if it does not meet the standard. Otherwise, imports are exempt from the tariff. Both firms stay in the market under a FQS and discriminatory import tariff. Total welfare in this case is greater than under free trade and under the optimal MQS (for a pure importing country). With uniform conditional tariffs also both firms stay in the market, however, the welfare obtained is greater than under free trade and lower than under a MQS